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Abstract 
 
The 1947 Bank nationalisation scheme – a prehistory of issues management?  
 
Industry-wide crises emanating from legislative proposals are rare in Australia and can be 
classed as once in a generation events and so merit consideration and research. 
 
Some focus on taxes and effects on industries -  Currently,  there is one such debate over 
the  Mineral Resources Rent Tax, proposed by Prime Minister’s Julia Gillard’s government. 
The carbon Tax another . But legislative changes that that propose vast public policy shifts 
are rare –  
 
Some are fiercely fought - the  1974 proposal for the establishment of a universal health 
insurance scheme.  Others such a free university tuition accepted. The 1947 proposal, by the 
Ben Chifley led Labor Government, aimed  to nationalise Australia’s banks brought a crisis of 
massive proportions to  Australia’s  conservative financial service industry.  Although the 
High Court of Australia finally found Chifley’s proposed legislation unconstitutional, the 
banks realised they must win in the court of public opinion, generate press coverage in 
favour of their position, and help defeat the Labor Government at the 1949 election. At the 
time, and for some decades to come, this was the most expensive and largest public 
relations campaign waged in Australia. After such a campaign there could be few Australians 
who could claim that they had not been exposed to the powers of public relations in a 
modern world. This paper looks at what can be learned from the banks’ collective response  
to the proposed nationalisation. It does so by  applying contemporary issues management 
evaluation techniques. 
 
 
Applying  Crisis and Issues Management to the Bank Nationalisation Scheme 
 
Howard Chase, the pioneer of IM defined it as  
 
“Issue management is the capacity to understand, mobilize, coordinate and direct all 
strategic and policy planning functions, and all public affairs/public relations skills, 
toward achievement of one objective: meaningful participation in creation of public 
policy that affects personal and institutional destiny” (Chase, 1982, p. 1).  
 
Macnamara (2012)has contextualised Chase’s development, Critical for my discipline, that  it was 
Chase who observed that  public relations advice and help were frequently  sought to respond to 
external forces and pressures as they gained momentum. 
 
 
The history of the attempt to nationalise the non-government banks in Australia does not neatly fit 
into recognised crisis typology or issue  management (IM) cycles.   
 
 
 
Is it reasonable to apply IM  in an era when recognition or even existence of such a concept did not 
exist? As with the  history of the practice of public relations – the functions were long evident – how 
they were identified  and then consolidated would  come later as organisations themselves 
recognised the professionalization of roles.  There is, as Jaques (2008) has noted, no definitive birth 
date for the practice issue management. However if we can retrospectively apply IM then perhaps it 
is worth considering Chase’ own definition  
  
 
 
Heath (1997) has noted that practitioners need to adopt and assertive and proactive stance.  
This is the action taken by Australia’s private banks when confronted by Prime Minister Chifley’s 
proposal. Clearly McConnan  and his fellow bankers’ actions reflect Chase’s  principles.  It must be 
remembered that the bankers sough not only defeat of legislation but also that of the Government 
that proposed such legislation.  
 
The factors that must be considered when examining the banks’ response  in an IM environment 
are:  i)  the imposition of regulated trading conditions in wartime; ii) the banks’ traditional reticence 
to comment  or be involved in political debate; iii) post-war landscape of social engineering; iv) the 
longevity of the issue 1944-1949 and v) this was an industry wide issue – not a single organisation. 
 
Howell (2009) notes that Heath (1977) indicates the four key functions in IM are: 
 
1. Anticipation of and analysis of issues 
2. Development of the organisational  position on the issues 
3. Identification of the key publics and those whose support is needed for the public  policy 
issues 
4. Identification of the desired behaviours of the key publics. 
 
Howell (2009) the refines this further by structuring IM into four key issues areas: identification, 
scanning, monitoring  and analysis although  Heath and Palenchar (2009) conversely and more 
correctly order the steps as scanning, identifying, monitoring, analysing and priority setting. 
 
 
I have indicated previously how well the “boiled frog analogy”  suits an organisation’s response in 
crisis and issues management  (Sheehan 2005). A frog dropped into a saucepan of boiling water 
quickly jumps out, placing a frog into a saucepan of cold water and slowly turn up the heat results in  
the frog becoming accustomed to the heat until it is boiled!   McConnan’s actions in 1944 reflect 
those of an organisation jumping out – his fellow bankers’ response more like a slow boil.  
 
Introducing Bank Nationalisation 1941-1945 
 
In late 1941 Australian  conservative political forces lost control of the Commonwealth 
parliament. Their internal disunity spilt into the parliament and so the Australian Labor Party 
under John Curtin formed a new government. In the role of federal treasurer was J B  (Ben) 
Chifley.  
 
Chifley had been absent from parliament for ten years but during his absence and in 
recognition of his capabilities, the conservative government had appointed him to various 
Government bodies. It was his experience on the Royal Commission on Monetary and 
Banking Systems in 1936 that would play out into the “most crucial drama in Australian 
political history” (Kemp, 1964,  p9).  In its recommendations published in 1937 Chifley 
dissented from his Commission colleagues opinion and stated:  
 
“I am of the opinion…that there is no possibility of…well-ordered progress being made in 
the community under s system in which there are privately-owned trading banks which have 
been established for the purposes of making a profit” and that “the best service to the 
community can be given only by a banking system…entirely under national control.”(Crisp, 
1961, p172) In saying this Chifley was also restating traditional Labor Party orthodoxy – 
nationalisation of the banking system. 
 
The irony of the Commission was that the banker regarded as “one of the best and most 
helpful witnesses” (Kemp 1964) delivering a “polished performance” which “impressed the 
Commissioners”(Merrett) was Leslie McConnan who as Chief Manager of  the National Bank 
of Australasia went on to mastermind and lead  the campaign to defeat the Banking 
Nationalisation legislation and ultimately defeat the Chifley government. 
 
It was then in late 1941 Chifley who became Australia chief financial regulator as Treasurer. 
His ability to manipulate the levers of the nation’s finance and monetary system was further 
strengthened as the nation faced the darkest of imminent Japanese invasion in  World War 
II. 
 
In 1944 the Government announced it would continue the wartime banking controls into 
the peace. In 1945, Chifley now as Prime Minister (and  unusually retaining  the position of 
treasurer) after the untimely death of Curtin, introduced a Banking Act that gave further 
control to the Government. Prime Minister “Chifley’s support for bank nationalisation was not 
due to any blind ideological commitment …(he) had seen the social and economic damage wrought 
by the Great Depression  and he was desperately afraid that the post-war  world would send 
Australia careering in to another one unless he kept a firm grip on the country’s economic levers , 
especially those levers previously  controlled by the private banks  and used by them to maximise 
their profits .”(Day, p460, 2001) 
 
The fight begins 1945-1947 
 
In the post-war climate of the “new order” society there was little sympathy for banks 
among Australians. It was only 15 years since the great depression when the collapse of the 
banks had lead to extreme hardship and financial misfortune for many. To create a positive 
opinion climate for the banking industry was a major public relations undertaking of itself 
but for the banks  to include in their strategy the defeat of  a popular government and 
leader was a very bold initiative.  
 
The political scene in Australia had changed dramatically in the post war period. The 
discredited conservative leader Robert Menzies had established a new conservative party – 
the Liberal Party in 1944.   Work started to ‘repackage Menzies as its (Liberal Party) leader 
and to persuade the electorate that he was an acceptable alternative to Chifley as Prime 
Minister’ (Golding, 2004,  p.179). Despite losing the 1946 election Menzies was supported 
by the private banks’ campaign to fight Chifley’s Bank Nationalisation Scheme from 1947 to 
1949. 
 
 
Chifley upset the conservatives – and in so doing the banks – by winning the 1946 elections. 
The banks had expected a change of government which would eliminate the banking 
legislation.  The nine major banks had tread carefully seeking not to antagonise the 
Government during the war and hoped for the prospect of a conservative Liberal 
government win. McConnan, even in the war, had been boldly resolute in his opposition to 
further government control of banking. In late 1944 in response to Chifley’s moves,  his bank 
– the National Bank of Australasia - wrote to all their customers against the “political control 
over industry and the individual.” (Blainey p357). This in itself was a bold and 
unprecedented move in Australian banking.  McConnan noted that “We are taking our 
courage in our hands, and breaking the traditional banking silence (my emphasis) by 
making a plain statement to our constituents.” (Blainey, p358). This communication was 
distributed by mail and hand, reprinted in newspapers and covered in opinion columns of 
the day ‘Hundreds of thousands of circulars (McConnan’s term for the material) were issued 
and the verbal fight was on in the press, Parliament and in the streets’ (Kemp p151).  It was 
the first shot in a war that would last almost as long as World War II. 
 
Still many banks were ‘fearful of departing from their long-standing tradition not to 
interfere in politics’ (Kemp p151). 
 
Historian Ross McMullin notes that ‘funds for this campaign were unlimited’. Others noted 
it was ‘the longest and most lavishly funded political campaign ever seen in Australia…a 
campaign estimated to cost several hundred thousand pounds.’ (Goot). The banks also 
realised that to change government they must change the public perception  of  Chifley and 
so “the carefully crafted public image of Chif’  as the old homespun Abe Lincoln philosopher’ 
began to be blasted away by the  most expensive publicity campaign in Australian history.” 
(Day, p460, 2001) 
 
The campaign to defeat the nationalisation of private banking and ultimately the Labor 
Government  commenced in earnest after the 1946 election when all major banks decided 
to take courage in their hands.  
 
Part of the legislation required all government bodies to bank with the government owned 
Commonwealth Bank. The Melbourne City Council decided to challenge this section (s48) in 
the High Court. The High Court declared the section invalid. The banks buoyed by this saw a 
way to weaken the Government’s position. But they were not prepared for Chifley’s 
response to the High Court decision. 
 
 On August 16, 1947, Chifley “dropped his bombshell” (Day p457)and informed Australia of  
the decision that his government would nationalise the trading banks. Conservative author 
Charles Kemp observed that “this entirely unexpected development hit the Australia 
community with the suddenness and force of an atomic explosion.”(p155) 
 
From this day forward  the “battle for the banks had entered its final, climatic stage” (Kemp 
p155)  
 
1947-1949 Banking on Victory 
 
When the banking bill was assented on November 27, 1947 the banks immediately 
challenged the legislation in the High Court “ while they simultaneously poured buckets of 
money into a public campaign of opposition to nationalisation”. (Day p464). Interestingly 
this time around the banks were leaving nothing to chance. Even though “They already had 
the public on their side with a gallup(sic) poll in September 1947 reporting  65% opposition 
and 21%  in favour”.   Their action was necessary because despite their efforts three months 
later  support for nationalisation had grown to 30% (p464 Day). 
 
 
 
The private banks had deep pockets for the campaign. Apart from  traditional advertising, 
radio serials were  broadcast from February 1948 to December 1949. One  featured the 
fictional John Henry Austral  a 'neighbourly but knowledgeable' political observer, 'able to 
see through sham and pretence'. The serials had no acknowledged provenance and 
emphasised the threat of Labor’s policies  (Goot). While the Banks funded the mass media 
campaigns their employees founded the Bank Employees Protest Committee (BEPC), a 
spontaneous grass roots effort to stop nationalisation.  As a group the private banks 
“provided the administrative support for a coordinated nationwide campaign against the 
government while the individual banks were generous in providing personnel and funds.” 
(Merrett) 
 
The success of John Henry Austral led to more dramatised serials in print and broadcast 
media (insert script). Once again many had no attribution to the Banks. The ‘Freeland 
Family’ (the name states the message!) was a newspaper serial – rather than a series of 
advertisements.  McConnan’s National Bank introduced the Australian public to the 
Freeland family in December 1947 the campaign lasted until   the 1949 election held in 
December. Featuring a wholesome family – mother, father, son, baby daughter all 
concerned about freedom and how a Government monopoly bank would make you a 
“number in a file”. (Insert Advertisements). 
 
 
On radio the campaign utilised entertainment not advertising there was: Star Pupil, Musical 
Families, Musical Comedy Stage, The Mantle of Greatness – based on the achievements of 
free enterprise and in Victoria ‘The Watchman’ a weekly  news commentary programme 
(May 1968). All delivered carefully crafted messages without identifying a specific party – 
but the bias was unmistakeable. 
 
By 1947 the banks had committed to a two year publicity campaign’ (May, 1968, p18) 
leading up to the 1949 election. In the final stages of the  election campaign the banks 
spared nothing in their attempt to defeat Chifley and his government. ‘ The bank had ‘an 
army of over four hundred men to command in the last few weeks of the campaign…and 
outside the full time forces was a reserve  of some thousands of men and women, 
employees and wives of employees.’ (May, 1968, p123)  
 
One bank employee active in the campaign was Bob White who, 40 years later in the 1980s, 
was Managing Director of Westpac. In his biography White states that the BEPC ‘distributed 
to us [bank employees] brown-covered handbooks…[which] were invaluable because they 
contained possible question which we were likely  to encounter when canvassing voters or 
leading discussions’ (White, 1995, p.24). White supports May’s earlier comments when he 
observes that ‘the way in which bank officers and their relatives worked on their campaign 
indicated their value as publicity agents’ (White, 1995, p.25). 
 
Some of the communication methods engaged in by the bank staff included visits to 60,000 
householders (34,000 in the 6 weeks prior to the election) in Victoria alone. The banks also 
distributed literature to over 300,000 homes in that state. The brochures and leaflets, 
cartoon pamphlets (notably one called What happened to Sam? – a children’s issue, had a 
print run of half a million) Reprints of newspaper articles, booklets of information circulars 
were also prepared and distributed. 
 
 
May also lists the activities of New South Wales based BEPC members in the final month of 
the campaign: ‘…speaking at street meetings; door-to-door canvassing; distribution of 
pamphlets, How to Vote Cards etc; organising teams to ask awkward questions at Labor 
meetings; acting as campaign managers for Liberal/C.P (Country Party – now National Party) 
candidates; writing newspaper articles and Letters to the Editor; giving talks in 
factories’(p123). 
 
Labor MPs were not immune from the distribution of banking information. First term MP 
Fred Daly termed the banks’ mail campaigns a ‘Frightening propaganda deluge’ (McMullin, 
2001, p.264) and he noted that “The most ordinary type of meeting in a suburb became a 
real fight. Banks sent out their staff  to do battle on the issue…”he ”feared it gave the banks 
a crucial headstart in the campaign for public support”. (Day p458) 
 
The banks, however, reasoned that ‘ a moderate sized press advertisement  seen once a 
fortnight , a radio commercial heard weekly, a film or pamphlet seen occasionally are not of 
themselves sufficient to create an impression of excessive publicity  on the part of the 
banks’ (May, 1968, p102). 
 
This was at this time and for many years to come  the most expensive and largest public 
relations campaign waged in Australia. May notes that advertising accounted for exactly half 
of the expenditure so we can assume that  public relations activities accounted for a 
reasonable amount of the remainder. After such a campaign there could be few Australians 
who could claim that they had not been exposed to the powers persuasion in a modern 
world. Every existing communication tool, one-way and two-way,  had been exploited and 
exploited successfully. 
 
After the banks challenged the validity of the Act in the High Court  and won the 
government appealed to the Privy Council in the UK. In July 1949 the appeal was dismissed. 
The banks had won the argument in the court of law – now they must win in the court of 
public opinion and defeat the Government to ensure nationalisation is dead and buried.  
 
The outcome of the election was a foregone conclusion. White states with pride  that 
‘Ultimately we achieved our objective with the fall of the Chifley Government in December 
1949 and the reaffirmation of the right of private trading banks to exist’ (p29).   Chifley 
himself remarked on his defeat he had “moved too fast on banking” and had “incited a well-
funded and popular campaign by the banks in communities across the country.” (Day p501) 
 
 
 
 
 Clearly McConnan’s experience with Chifley’s membership of the 1936 Royal Commission on 
Banking lead him to Anticipate and Identify the further regulation of banking under Chifley as 
treasurer and then Prime Minister was probable. Once Labor ascended to power in 1941 McConnan 
would have monitored this issue – however is this reasonable given Australia’s wartime footing?  
Jaques (2000) has pointed no organisation can identify, track and respond to every issue – certainly 
under wartime conditions such would not be achievable.  But McConnan, through his ‘Circular’ of 
1944 has met Heath and Palenchar’s (2009) criteria for issue monitoring – 1) Journalists believe the 
issues is worth covering (difficult in wartime with censorship and war news competing 2) harm to 
operations (remember  this is looking to after the war) and most critical 3) the issue is associated 
with one group that has the potential of bringing it to the legislative agenda (it was Labor party No 1 
Policy for over 20 years to nationalise  banking – [Day, p461]). 
 
However it can be argued with the end of War  the banks expected a relaxing of the wartime 
regulations  which included: fixing of interest and exchange rates;  and control of all capital 
movements in to and out of Australia; details off all accounts of activities and the maintenance of 
compulsory deposits with the Central Bank(Salsbury). 1945 and the Allied victory  sees the majority 
of the banks, except McConnan’s , as still in the saucepan and warming up nicely. 
 
The extension of Chifley’s  regulations  into peacetime and then his call in 1948 for nationalisation 
meant finally the issue had surfaced. By 1948 the banks had identified their key support publics: 
their staff and their customers.  Not just staff but their families also because  
 
“Above all , a job as bank clerk was one of the most respected  careers for white collar workers. 
Their families did not want to see them become public  servants or restricted in their opportunities. 
Bank officers accordingly threw themselves with enthusiasm into the determined and well-funded 
campaign which was at once mounted by the banks in resistance to nationalisation”(Bolton1996, 
p46).  Accordingly the desired behaviours of employees were quickly and easily identified  and the 
sustained public relations  campaign and its messages soon made customers aware. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The failure of the Labor Government’s bank nationalisation proposal was ultimately 
responsible  for changing the face of the nation for a generation. Prime Minister J B Chifley’s 
ambition to nationalise the private banks would ultimately allowed Robert Menzies to not 
only resurrect his tarnished political career with a second chance at Prime Ministership but 
also allow Menzies’ new party, the Liberals,  to reshape conservative politics and  sell a 
vastly different brand of political philosophy to the Australian people. For Leslie McConnan 
of the National Australasian Bank, perhaps can be attributed the posthumous title as 
Australia’s first Issues Manager. His own actions during the campaign saw him “absent from 
his desk for months at a time, travelling to lobby and organise, to galvanise his loyal troops 
of bank-workers and to make public appearances” (Merrett). His well-developed issues 
analysis and priority setting capabilities, of understanding the public policy process, 
anticipating the social and political changes and understanding each advocates’ objectives 
(Heath and Pelanchar) assured success from an early stage. Can we attribute IM to earlier 
times? To call the banking anti-nationalisation campaign a public relations campaign seems 
to sell short the strategic intent and value. McConnan’s wider message of freedom created, 
as Heath and Pelanchar stipulate, a zone of meaning embraced and understood by Menzies 
and his Liberal Party and the Australian public. 
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